

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF  
THE INVITATIONAL SPEECHES AT BADEN-BADEN  
BY NAGOYA AND SEOUL FOR  
THE 1988 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPICS  
— A Case Study in International Persuasion —**

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Abstract

On September 30, 1981, the International Olympic Committee announced in Baden-Baden their decision to award the 1988 Summer Olympics to Seoul. Those who were involved in the invitational activities for the Nagoya Olympics as well as the people throughout Japan were taken by surprise at the news of the landslide defeat of Nagoya, because the majority of them were convinced of Nagoya's victory until the last moment.

In order to explore the reasons why this stunning result was brought about, the author develops the context and surrounding circumstances which preceded the delivery of the invitational speeches. The author then speculates that those invitational speeches made by both Nagoya and Seoul's representatives on September 29 played a significant

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part in influencing the voters – 79 IOC members.

This is a conspicuous example of international communication and persuasion which the author analyzes by applying Kenneth Anderson's (1978) framework, breaking persuasion into (1) attention, (2) comprehension, and (3) acceptance. A detailed rhetorical analysis of the invitational speeches by four speakers is made. The analysis shows that Seoul's presentations were more effective in persuading the audience by skillfully dramatizing the event and meeting the expectations of the audience that were internationally represented.

The author finally examines possible relationships between this international communication event and English education in Japan.

### Introduction

In spite of a sizable amount of money and manpower mobilized for over four years in her efforts to secure the invitation, Nagoya failed to realise her dream of becoming the host city for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. The outcome of voting at the International Olympic Committee (IOC) General Meeting in Baden-Baden on September 30, 1981 resulted in a landslide victory for Seoul with a clear vote of 52 to 27, and surprised the majority of the Japanese.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese press had consistently been reporting that Nagoya would, after all, be selected, even though by a slight margin. The enormous power of the press to influence its readership might have intensified the degree of shock on the part of the Japanese. As a matter of fact, however, even the delegates from Seoul could not predict such an overwhelming victory.<sup>2</sup>

Why, then, did such a dramatic shift take place? Why had the prediction by the press been completely reversed? And

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how did such a turn of events occur? While there are numerous factors involved that might have contributed to the outcome, I speculate that the invitational speeches made by Nagoya and Seoul the day before the voting played a significant role in shaping the minds of the voters, i.e., the 79 IOC members.

During the presentations, each candidate city no doubt concentrated her energy on obtaining the majority votes of the IOC members, who are cross-nationally represented and yet at the same time owe allegiance to the Olympic ideals. The delegates of both cities used mainly English as their means of communication to get their messages across to this international body. I believe, therefore, that an analysis of their invitational speeches will enable those involved in English education to shed some light on the nature and characteristics of international persuasion.

In this paper, I will first describe the background of the presentation, and then compare and contrast the rhetorical strategies employed by Nagoya and Seoul. Through this analysis, I will explore the crucial elements in international persuasion, and will suggest ways the Japanese style of communication in international settings can be improved. Finally, I will draw some implications from this analysis for English education in Japan.

### Background

#### International Campaign

On August 24, 1977, a press conference was held with Governor Nakaya of Aichi Prefecture where the city of Nagoya is located. He proposed that Nagoya be the host city to the 24th International Summer Olympic Games to be held in 1988. A very influential local newspaper reported this with a bold headline reading, "Nagoya to Invite '88 Interna-

tional Olympics.”<sup>3</sup> Mayor Motoyama of Nagoya was rather cautious about revealing his intension. He said, “What is necessary first of all is that both the national and local governments reach consensus. I myself would like to see how my fellow citizens of Nagoya would react to it.”<sup>4</sup>

Despite Mayor Motoyama's humble statement, one can imagine that a considerable amount of *nemawashi* or ground work with at least several leaders of government, business and sports world must have been laid out by this time. The fact that Governor Nakaya had a press conference indicates that it was not purely his own idea any more.

It is quite conceivable that Governor Nakaya made such a proposal at this moment. Nagoya, a major city in the central part of Japan, with a population of over two million, had been lagging behind the other two major cities of Tokyo and Osaka in terms of “internationalization.” Tokyo, the capital of Japan, hosted the Olympic Games in 1964, the first Olympics ever held in Asia. This international event in Tokyo marked a milestone in the process of Japan's postwar modernization. It was often said that after this event Japan was recognized as a full-fledged member of the international community. Six years later, Osaka hosted the Japan World Exposition 1970 (EXPO '70), the first time it had ever been held in Asia. A total of 77 countries and other international organizations participated to make it the largest world exposition since the first one held in London in 1851.<sup>5</sup> Thus Osaka also became known to the world.

Sandwiched between Tokyo and Osaka geographically, Nagoya had not gained the benefit from holding such an internationally-recognized event. Under such circumstances, Governor Nakaya probably made his proposal to activate the regional industries and accelerate the development of Nagoya as an international city.

Let us briefly describe the selection process for the host city. In order to host the Olympic Games, a candidate city has

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to be chosen by the IOC. The host city has to guarantee that all the games are organized in such a way as to satisfy and meet the requirements of the IOC.<sup>6</sup> It is not enough for the city to meet the requirements fully; it also has to put up with the time-consuming selection process. First, the mayor of the host city approves her candidacy. Second, the candidacy needs to be approved by the National Olympic Committee (NOC). Third, it must be approved by the national government.<sup>7</sup> When this process is completed, the city sends her application to the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, by a given deadline. Next, the city must provide detailed answers by another due date to IOC's questionnaires that include (1) general questions, (2) questions from the International Sports Federation (ISF), and (3) questions on media coverage.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the decision is made at an IOC general meeting by secret ballot of the members. Before the final decision is made, each candidate city is given an opportunity to exhibit her display for about a week during the sessions of the IOC meeting and then to make her presentation for about an hour and a half, usually the day before the actual voting.<sup>9</sup>

It can be said from the explanation made so far that invitational activities by cities for Olympic Games somewhat resemble political election campaigns, particularly the U.S. presidential election, which can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period lasts until a candidate is nominated by the party convention. The second stage involves vigorous campaigning by each candidate throughout the country, until the day before election. Campaign speeches by the candidates greatly influence the potential voters. A T.V. debate between the two candidates is a good case in point. It can be speculated that in a similar way, the presentations given by cities play an important part in influencing the voters, in this case the IOC members. In the case of this rivalry between Nagoya and Seoul, the calm and peaceful city of Baden-Baden turned into the stage for this dramatic confrontation.

### Chronology of Nagoya and Seoul's Candidacy

Nagoya made the first move in attempting to host the 1988 Olympics. As was said earlier, Governor Nakaya of Aichi prefecture proposed in August, 1977 the idea of the '88 Nagoya Olympics. Nakaya disclosed his idea at this time, because the host city for the '84 Olympics would be finalized in October, 1977 and attention would be directed to the host cities of the '88 Olympics shortly after.<sup>10</sup> In fact, Sydney had already expressed her desire to be the host city. Also other cities such as Brussels, Algiers, Teheran and Melbourne announced their interests one after another in their bids for the '88 Olympics shortly after Nagoya's declaration.<sup>11</sup>

The year 1979 found Seoul also interested in making a bid.<sup>12</sup> The Republic of Korea had a plan for hosting the Asian Games during the 1980s and the Olympics during the 1990s. Some officials of both the government and national athletic association said, however, that "we are aiming at the next Olympics after Los Angeles. It is the most feasible year in view of the IOC's principle that Olympics should be held on every continent in turn."<sup>13</sup> Thus, the campaign for the '88 Olympics had become a very tough endeavor for all candidates, as there were many interested cities.

In the meantime, an IOC Council Meeting was held in Nagoya during the period from October 23 to 26 in 1979. Nagoya capitalized on this occasion to impress the IOC council members with Nagoya. The participants at the meeting made an inspection tour to the site of the main stadium and other sports facilities, in and around Nagoya.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, in Seoul on October 26, 1979, President Park of the Republic of Korea was assassinated, something which shocked the whole world.<sup>15</sup> Due to the political turmoil after this incident, very few invitational activities by Seoul was reported during this time period.

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On the international scene, U.S. President Carter warned the Soviet Union on January 6, 1980 of his intention of boycotting the Moscow Olympics unless the Soviet Union withdrew her troops from Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> The Kremlin did not respond. President Carter lost no time in asking his allies to act in concert with the United States. Ultimately, Japan made the tough decision not to send any delegation to the Moscow Olympics held during the summer of 1980.<sup>17</sup>

In spite of the above, the campaign by Nagoya continued. On October 17, 1980, the Japanese government finally approved Nagoya's bid.<sup>18</sup> This approval, however, did not mean that the government would extend as much financial assistance as Nagoya needed. Compared with the Tokyo and Sapporo Olympics, the attitude the central government showed toward Nagoya was far from that of enthusiasm, reflecting the nation's financial difficulties and the world-wide recession.<sup>19</sup> By the deadline of November 30, 1980, Nagoya, Melbourne, and Athens submitted their applications to the IOC.<sup>20</sup> In addition, Seoul's delayed application, which arrived a few days after the deadline, was accepted by the IOC as "a delay in postal service."<sup>21</sup>

Of all the candidates, Melbourne was considered to be Nagoya's most powerful rival.<sup>22</sup> Melbourne held the Olympics in 1956 and hence had the facilities for most of the games available, and what's more, is well known all over the world. However, she suddenly gave up her bid on February 25, 1981, giving the Nagoya contingent much more hope of realizing their dream.<sup>23</sup> By the end of February, 1981, the due date for answers to IOC questionnaires, only Nagoya and Seoul had completed the submission of their answers. It was disclosed on March 3 that Athens had given up her bid, thus leaving only Nagoya and Seoul to compete.<sup>24</sup>

From this time until September, both Nagoya and Seoul actively campaigned for their bids, for example, by inviting

IOC and NOC members to their cities, and by sending their representatives to various countries to solicit the support of each IOC member.<sup>25</sup> Throughout this period, the Japanese press had been reporting that Nagoya was well ahead in the race.<sup>26</sup> The IOC Council Meeting held in Lausanne on April 9 decided that the ballot for the host cities of the '88 Olympics would be cast in the afternoon of September 30, during the IOC General Meeting to be held in Baden-Baden.<sup>27</sup> Both Nagoya and Seoul decided to send large delegations to Baden-Baden to make their final appeals for hosting the Games.<sup>28</sup>

### Campaign Activities at Baden-Baden

Reviewing how Nagoya and Seoul carried out their invitational campaigns, one is surprised to find sharp contrasts between the two. One sharp contrast was in the composition of the delegation. Another contrast was in the displays at the Exhibition Hall. A third one was in the manner the delegates behaved in Baden-Baden, especially in their approaches to IOC members.

As to the composition of the delegation, Nagoya's 47-member delegation was largely composed of old dignitaries from central and local government; whereas Seoul's approximately 30-member delegation was mainly composed of young diplomats, members of sports organizations and reporters well versed in English.<sup>29</sup> This sharp contrast may reflect the basic differences between the two cities in their criteria for selection of the delegates. In the case of Japan, the ability of speaking English was not considered so important as with the case of the Korean delegates. Looking at the differences in delegates from Seoul and Nagoya, it is also important to question what type of English speakers we intend to foster in Japan. Are we looking for persons who can speak English for propriety only, or do we want to develop the talent to exert



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a positive effect in communicating with non-Japanese?

The display was opened on September 22 at the Exhibition Hall. Japan's section looked simple and modest. The 48 panels featuring Nagoya were put up on the wall. In the center was a miniature of the main stadium. The hall was accentuated by 25 *Gifu Chochin* or paper lanterns made in Gifu, hanging from the ceiling, and by the alcove set up in one corner in which a scroll with "Nagoya" in Chinese characters, was hanging. The hall was on the whole simply made and looked spacious, designed to allow the smooth traffic of visitors.<sup>30</sup>

Seoul's display was a contrast to the simple, Oriental tone of Nagoya's. More than 200 panels featuring Seoul's sports and cultural facilities were displayed. And a gorgeous miniature of Seoul's National Sports Center in the center caught the attention of visitors. Above all, a large T.V. monitor placed at one corner gave visitors dynamic views of Seoul and her sports facilities. Many Korean beauties were serving as hostesses, giving away lavishly such small gifts as badges, paper weights, fans, and pennants, together with pamphlets.<sup>31</sup> Two German newspapers reportedly said, "Seoul's heart-warming displays are attracting visitors' attention."<sup>32</sup>

Realizing that Nagoya's display was much less popular, the staff of Nagoya looked for alternate strategies. They telephoned the headquarters in Japan to send more gifts such as badges and fans. They were also busy xeroxing their leaflets because they were in short supply. They asked Japan Air Lines to send more stewardesses to look after visitors, although these stewardesses did not know much about Nagoya.<sup>33</sup> It was obvious, however, that Seoul's exhibition was more favorably received. Local papers in West Germany reportedly made such comments as, "Seoul's displays are more colorful, attractive, and eye-catching," "Nagoya's displays are simple and flat. They look inactive, spiritless, and even apathetic."<sup>34</sup> Another paper wondered "if Nagoya is

just waiting for the final judgment.”<sup>35</sup> One European reporter asked a Japanese reporter, “Why don’t they campaign actively?”<sup>36</sup>

Reporters agreed that the Korean team was more active in lobbying, too. In addition to the official members of the delegation, more than 100 diplomats and dignitaries based in Europe and North and South America were mobilized to contact IOC, ISF and NOC members.<sup>37</sup> Seoul’s delegates were reported to be contacting the IOC members who were in favor of Nagoya, but were concerned about the decision of the host city for the ’88 Winter Olympic Games.<sup>38</sup> The Koreans’ aggressive lobbying activities can be summarized in such reporting as, “Koreans are admirably active and brave, knowing the ultimate loss of the game,”<sup>39</sup> and “Korean members are visible everywhere — halls, conference halls, lobbies, etc.”<sup>40</sup>

Nagoya’s campaign was more passive and formal. Most of the time, the delegates were staying together in the same hotel.<sup>41</sup> Whenever dignitaries from Japan arrived in Baden-Baden, the lower-ranking members were busy welcoming them rather than selling Nagoya to IOC members.<sup>42</sup> They behaved modestly during this period, thinking that they had done enough in securing the majority of votes. So only a few members, such as Mr. Kiyokawa and Mr. Takeda, two IOC members from Japan, were paying courtesy calls to IOC members.<sup>43</sup> Gradually, however, they became apprehensive about the final outcome, and realized they had to do more to retain their lead over Seoul.

One big headache for Nagoya was the existence of anti-Nagoya Olympic demonstrations, active and visible in Baden-Baden. They decided to send a letter to each IOC member pointing out that the opposition movement was minimal in Nagoya, and would not influence the staging of the Olympics.<sup>44</sup> Also, to try and keep pace with the aggressive campaigns initiated by the Korean delegates, Dr. Azuma sent

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cables from Japan to those IOC members he knew, for final solicitation.<sup>45</sup> Despite these rollbacks, Nagoya's campaign on the whole left just a modest impression. To some IOC members, Nagoya's delegation looked optimistic and even arrogant, being confident of their desired outcome, without showing a gesture of sincere appeal to the IOC members.<sup>46</sup> As a matter of fact, the two most important figures from Japan arrived in Baden-Baden at the end of the game. Mayor Motoyama arrived on September 26 and Governor Nakaya on 27.<sup>47</sup>

In this particular context, we can question why Japanese delegates in Baden-Baden, who had access to English media depicting their efforts as flagging, did not react more vigorously. Is it the case that they did not believe the media since it was in English? This is of course a speculative consideration, but it may reflect the Japanese desire to learn English without using it.

## Discussion

### Target Audience

It was decided by lot that Nagoya's presentation be made first, beginning at 3:00 P.M., to be followed by Seoul at 4:30 P.M. the same afternoon. Each city was allowed to send six official delegates to the conference hall for presentation.<sup>48</sup> The audience consisted of IOC, ISF and NOC members, and any others such as reporters were excluded as the presentation was part of the agenda of the IOC General Meeting.<sup>49</sup> As the secret votes were cast by 79 IOC members, let us briefly identify the characteristics of the IOC members.

The IOC was first formed by Count Pierre de Coubertin in 1894, the founder of Modern Olympic Movement. To realise the Olympic ideals — to promote world peace through sports

for one — Coubertin organized a committee composed of those aristocrats who sympathized with the Olympic ideals, and contributed to promotion of sports. He wanted to keep the committee free from outside political influence to maintain their ideals. (Miller, 1979:27)

As of September 1981, the total number of IOC members was 82.<sup>50</sup> They had been selected on such criteria as past sports records, region, contribution to Olympic movement. Many of them were old. Some were 80 (Miller, 1979:20). For more than 80 years since its foundation, the IOC had functioned in its own way and had managed to organize Olympic Games every four years except during wartime. Nevertheless, it had received various criticisms from outside. It was often nicknamed as “an undemocratic organization,” “an outdated organization composed of old aristocrats,” or “a dogmatic coterie of senior citizens (pp. 3-16).” Despite these criticisms, the IOC had been active and kept this world-wide sports event relatively free from the political powers of the times (pp. 25-52).

Unlike many other international organizations, IOC members do not necessarily represent their own countries. For instance, the two Japanese members of IOC, Mr. Masaji Kiyokawa and Mr. Tsunenori Takeda, were chosen as IOC members due primarily to their outstanding contributions to the Olympic movement. In this sense, each IOC member is like an “ambassador” of IOC dispatched to each nation (p. 17). There is a rule of thumb in nominating IOC members. Usually, one is selected from each country, and two from the countries where Olympics have been held in the past, or from some countries which have made significant contributions to the Olympic movement. For example, such nations as U.K., France, Spain, Greece, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., India and Japan have two members each. Out of these, Spain and India had not staged the Olympics, but have made unique contributions to the Olympic Movement (p. 24).

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In summary, IOC is a unique organization, composed of 82 members, relatively old and wealthy with a brilliant record of contributions to the Olympic ideals. Even though their professional and cultural backgrounds differ considerably, they owe allegiance to the Olympic ideals which are embodied in the Olympic Charter (pp. 40-50). With this audience in mind, both Nagoya and Seoul formed their strategies for presentation. Each presentation included a film show, an introductory speech, and a main invitational speech, as well as questions and answers.<sup>51</sup> Due to a lack of sufficient information concerning the film show and questions and answers, I will focus my analysis on the introductory and main invitational speeches.

### Methods of Analysis

As I will make a rhetorical analysis to find out to what extent the messages given by both contenders had been effective in inducing IOC members' cooperation to support their candidacy, this analysis necessarily deals with elements of persuasion. In my analysis, I apply Kenneth E. Anderson's theory of persuasion which analyzes persuasion in terms of three stages: attention, comprehension, and acceptance (Anderson, 1978:198-207). He argues, "the basis of evaluation of language and style in persuasion is the effect of these elements in determining persuasion outcomes" (p. 198). Since the outcome of the presentation is already history, it is necessary to make a thorough analysis of the effect of these elements that might have led to the outcome. Anderson continues, "this approach yields a judgment of language and associated stylistic feature in terms of their effect on the mediational process of attention, comprehension, and acceptance" (p. 198). While it is sometimes difficult to make clear distinctions among the said three stages, I will use these stages for clearer understanding of organization, language and style of the messages which are the keys to the examination of

rhetorical strategies employed in the speeches. Throughout my analysis, I will assign combinations of positive, neutral, and negative ratings to the results of multitudinous verbal and discourse strategies used by each contender, to secure the attention, comprehension, and acceptance of the IOC "target" audience.

Attention, the first stage of persuasion, can be defined as "a set or posture, by which we select out of our environment those stimuli that are related to our interest and needs" (Brembeck and Howell, 1976:270). In this connection, Anderson argues, "Not everything in a communication can receive maximum emphasis. Some things must be placed in the sun, some in the shade" (Anderson, 1978:199). He also states, "departures from the norm that are not incorrect are stylistic . . . . To the degree that these departures must be novel, unusual, and have elements of change and variety, these methods serve to select attention" (p. 198). In my analysis of attention, I will pick up the parts which seem to draw attention, because they are somewhat unusual or deviant from the norm in view of the invitational speeches.

Comprehension, the second stage of persuasion, is defined as clarification of the intended messages. Anderson argues, "proper word choice is the key to comprehension by the communicator" (pp. 201-202). He asserts, for example, "definition may be offered through restatement, through the context, by examples, by negation" (p. 203). One can estimate that these skills serve to increase comprehension. In my analysis of comprehension, I will examine how the main themes and arguments are introduced and to what extent these factors served comprehension.

The last stage of persuasion involves acceptance. Kenneth Burk argues, "Persuasion occurs as the source and receiver become identified with each other through the linguistic strategies employed" (p. 204). Anderson calls this state

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identification (p. 204). In order to induce identification, the speaker needs to either convince the listeners that his idea is right or he offers a new idea that will work better or satisfy the self-interests of the listeners. Internalization is a step forward from the state of identification. I define internalization as a process in which one is engaged in taking the idea presented as his own so that it might easily lead to his action, embodying such an idea. In order to induce internalization, the speaker must link his new ideas with the hypothetical or actual situation with the reinforcement of illustration and confirmation. What is crucial in campaign speeches is to make sure the listeners internalize the ideas and values of the speaker. In addition to these states, the traditional three proofs, that is, logical, emotional and ethical proof, will be taken into consideration in evaluating acceptance (pp. 162-165). With these factors in mind, I will examine the components that might have led to acceptance.

### Analysis I: Attention

#### A. Nagoya

##### 1. Strong Personal Tone of an Old Face (Positive-Negative)

Following the introduction of the six official members from Nagoya, and showing of the 16-minute movie "Nagoya," the two-minute taped message by Dr. Azuma was played back.<sup>52</sup> This arrangement was made because Dr. Azuma, President of the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council, could not come to Baden-Baden due to his poor health.<sup>53</sup> The taped message was concerned mostly with his apology for not coming to Baden-Baden. For instance, he said, "I retired from the active membership and became an honorary member in 1968. . .my Olympic friends in Japan persuaded me, an octogenarian, to come out of the retirement."<sup>54</sup> He vividly reminded the

majority of the IOC members of his old, familiar face, for he was a well-known figure, particularly among old members involved in the Tokyo Olympics. Despite his age, he decided to accept the presidency of the Nagoya Olympic Council, "remembering the excitement, . . . 20 years ago, . . . to lead the Nagoya Delegation. . ."

Nevertheless, Dr. Azuma was advised by his doctor not to fly to Baden-Baden. He said, "To my deep regret, my doctor's advice has prevented me from . . .," and went on, "alas, my old bones are creaking, so to speak." Thus, he made quite an emotional appeal to the listeners. Finally, he hoped that the IOC would "give us the chance to see another Olympic Games in my country during my lifetime." When this taped presentation finished, there occurred an unexpectedly big burst of applause.<sup>55</sup> Actually, his message was filled with his strong personal tone and direct appeal. I presume, however, that this applause was to express the audience's sympathy with Dr. Azuma personally, suggesting that his message attracted attention, but did not necessarily serve in Nagoya's favor.

## 2. Omission of Main Issues of Concern (Neutral-Negative)

Mr. Shigemitsu Miyake, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council, made his major invitational speech for Nagoya. After expressing a few words of typical greetings, Mr. Miyake said, "The words of Dr. Azuma have already expressed the aspirations, hopes and expectations of the citizens of Nagoya, . . . Therefore, my presentation will concentrate on concrete issues: how. . ., and how. . ." The audience must have felt something important was missing at this moment. Dr. Azuma honestly expressed his hope and appeal, but he did not mention very much about why Nagoya wanted to host the Olympics. So, Mr. Miyake was expected to touch on this point. However, this crucial issue of why the Olympics would have been significant for Nagoya was



avoided. Perhaps, this omission of an important issue could have caught attention, but negatively. Of course, Mr. Miyake touched on Nagoya, describing her as the third industrial metropolis in Japan. This statement probably assured the listeners of Nagoya's ability to manage the Olympic Games, but failed to adequately explain why Nagoya, not Seoul.

Mr. Miyake employed itemization which probably did not work well in maintaining attention. In explaining the major points of Nagoya's plan, he said, "The first regards timing." "The second point concerns the number of sporting events." "Now the third point. Concerning the Olympic village, . . . ." He went on to describe Nagoya's plan in terms of sports facilities, accommodations, transportation, entry, public support, and financing, etc. Indeed, these are important considerations, but these technical matters had already been fully communicated to the listeners.<sup>56</sup> In other words, those itemizations were not logically connected with each other, but rather fragmented. Only salient points should have been presented, so as to gain attention. It can be said that the itemization in such a way might have served to gain attention at first, but later it gradually lost the attention of the audience.

In this connection, I believe that language educators in Japan should make more efforts in introducing the sense of exploratory spirit or spirit of language play available in English expression. Through the mastery of such creativity in language use, one can stimulate or entertain his listeners more effectively.

### B. Seoul

#### 1. Creation of Temporal Thrill and Sensation (Positive)

As soon as the introduction of the six official delegates was over, Mr. Young-su Park, the Mayor of Seoul, went to the plat-

form to deliver his introductory address. He allegedly read his speech in Korean which was translated consecutively by someone in English.<sup>57</sup> Probably the choice of the mayor of the host city as a first speaker gained favorable attention in terms of credibility, for he was the person most responsible for the invitation. This speech was effective in creating a sense of temporal thrill and excitement through skillful use of connectives, use of present progressive forms of verbs. He said, for example, "At this very moment, the 38 million people of the Republic of Korea. . . are focusing their attention and expectation on this IOC session."<sup>58</sup>

In a similar manner, Mr. Sang-ho Cho, President of the Korean Olympic Committee who made a major invitational speech, was skillful in creating a vivid imaginative representation of the Olympics in Seoul as if they were being staged at that exact moment. For instance, towards the end of his presentation, he said:

I sincerely hope to have the opportunity of welcoming all the IOC members gathered here at the grand ceremony for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in the main stadium in Seoul. It will be a great honor and pleasure for me personally as well as in my official capacity.

## 2. New Vision through Gradual Build-up (Positive)

Mr. Cho chose to itemize several issues in the middle of his presentation. He said, "First, Seoul is the capital of . . .," "Second, the city of Seoul has successfully organized . . .," "Third, except for . . ., Seoul already has most of the necessary sports facilities . . ." Unlike the itemization of Nagoya's, Mr. Cho itemized each issue in a coherent manner so that each issue was organized as an essential unit in a gradually accumulating whole, unfolding like a story being told. Moreover, explanation of each theme was made to highlight the contrast

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with her rival city.

In an attempt to communicate why Seoul would be a better choice, Seoul's presentation employed a variety of devices such as the use of negation, direct appeal, proper choice of conjunctions, adjectives, and verbs. Particularly noteworthy was the carefully constructed sets of sentences that might have helped to change the attitudes of the audience by gradually building up their assertions. Mayor Park, for instance, stated:

I am not proposing Seoul as the site for the 1988 Olympics, simply because facilities both already built and now under construction would best meet the requirements of Olympic Games. This is, of course, a very important consideration. But even more important, we believe that Olympic Games would accomplish the goal of the Olympic Movement of contributing to world peace.

Another example of gradual build-up was observed in Mr. Cho's speech which probably served to command attention on Seoul's sore spot, i.e., the division of the country. He approached this issue with great care, politeness, and self-confidence:

I would like to specially address some members here who might be concerned about the reality of the division of my country. I wish to express my deep appreciation on this occasion to the delegates of those countries with whom we have as yet no formal invitations for their initiative. . . and for their participation in sports events in our country.

In order to refute this weakness, Mr. Cho was not in a hurry. First, he expressed his appreciation to those who were concerned about the issue, and then touched on the status quo.

Later, he proposed a new idea for solution. This was one of the best examples of slowly but steadily building up one's claim, thus serving to gain attention.

## **Analysis II: Comprehension**

### **A. Nagoya**

#### **1. Japan has Experience and Technology (Neutral-Negative)**

Mr. Miyake stressed that Japan could successfully organize the '88 Olympics, because she has experience and technology. He guaranteed smooth operation of the Games based on "the experience already gained by Japan in organizing the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Sapporo." Further, he stressed "we will utilize the latest and highest technology being developed in Japan. . ."

It may be true that Japan has more experience than ROK in organizing international sports events. But what about Nagoya vis-a-vis Seoul? The speech did not touch specifically upon Nagoya's capability. Mr. Miyake said, "given the seven years of preparation time, Nagoya can assure you that the most modern facilities will be readied, utilizing the best of Japanese technology." The emphasis on Japanese technology was placed probably to refute the weakest point of Nagoya, that is, there were no facilities at that time. Nevertheless, this strategy did not work well, partly because the statements were rather abstract, without supportive evidence, and partly because the relevant sentences used too many qualifiers, future tenses, and superlatives. Moreover, emphasis was put on the technical aspects of Japan rather than conveying the enthusiasm of the citizens of Nagoya.

### 2. Political Stability and Guarantee of Smooth Operation (Neutral-Negative)

What kinds of strategies were employed in communicating Nagoya's foremost advantage and Seoul's clear-cut disadvantage? The speech resorted to the frequent use of direct statement without much substantiation. Mr. Miyake stated, "Japan is a very politically stable country," "Japan is the safest nation in the world, and security for the proper conduct of the Games will be ensured. . . ." Referring to the opposition groups, Mr. Miyake refuted, "As Japan's political situation is quite stable, . . . we will surely be able to carry them quite successfully, even if there might be such groups."

It is questionable whether such direct messages about the political stability of Japan served the intended purpose. It was clear that Nagoya stressed this stability as her foremost advantage. Was this strategy in Nagoya's favor? Probably not. As a matter of fact, this was the point the press criticized most severely after they learned that Nagoya lost her bid. They criticized that the emphasis on this point might have invoked a sense of "self-complacency" and "optimism" of Japan as an economic super power.<sup>59</sup> The listeners probably got the impression that Japan was kindly offering a refuge or shelter for the IOC and athletes, for the Olympics in the past had suffered a lot politically. To put it differently, it conveyed a protector's attitude. "Please come to this safe place. Then, you don't have to be worried about anything." It seemed, however, that most of the IOC members had been aware of this political stability of Japan. By employing direct appeals too frequently, the audience's favorable attitude might have turned into an unfavorable one, thus helping to advance the cause of Seoul.

Another question that comes to mind was whether or not this strategy was in accord with the Olympic ideals. The

Olympic Charter states that the Olympics should promote better understanding among people from all over the world (Miller, 1979:240). Nagoya's assurance of smooth operation sounded rather a conservative one, short of positive contribution to the Olympic ideals. Thus, the rhetorical strategy of Nagoya, together with frequent use of direct appeal, future tenses, adjectives, and adverbs probably did not work well. On the contrary, the speech communicated a sense of uncertainty, complacency, as well as lack of spirit for challenge and enthusiasm.

## **B. Seoul**

### **1. A Forum for Dialogue and Communication for Peace (Positive-Neutral)**

Political tension in the Korean peninsula was a disadvantage for Seoul. As was discussed earlier, Seoul's strategy was to recognize this first, and to appreciate the listener's concern about this issue, and then refute it with a new perspective. Specifically, the speech emphasized this weakness as an area where IOC members could play an important role, that is, bringing peace to this region and the whole world by actually going to Seoul. Mayor Park declared:

The Olympic Games in Seoul would accomplish the goal of the Olympic Movement of contributing to world peace, since the spirit of international goodwill through fair sportsmanship would help insure a true and lasting peace on Korean soil.

To further his assertion, Mayor Park stated, "Olympic Games in Seoul would truly be a forum for peace and broadened mutual understanding among all mankind." In a similar manner, Mr. Cho provided a new perspective by saying, "one

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of the most important roles the IOC plays in the quest of world peace is to provide a forum for dialogue and communication . . .”

The above is a beautiful example of “rhetoric of conversion” that turned a Seoul’s disadvantage into an advantage. Seoul’s speeches were in this sense successful in refutation, satisfying the ego-needs of the audience with suggestions for possible actions to be taken by the listeners. The audience must have felt that they were the ones who could bring peace to the troubled land. Provision of a new insight and new proposal with moral overtones might have impressed the listeners and hence served to command positive comprehension.

### 2. Facilities Almost Ready for Games (Positive)

How did Seoul communicate the reportedly clear-cut advantage? A brief look at the speeches reveals a number of devices employed to impress the listeners. Mr. Cho stated, for instance, “construction has been under way already for a number of years, . . . the city in 1977 secured a sports site of 545,000m which will include as its centerpiece the main stadium with a capacity of 100,000.” He also added, “the stadium will be ready for use by 1983.”

One can find out that the Korean speakers tried to avoid using personal pronouns as subjects in the sentences when speaking of these facilities. This seems to be effective in making an objective description of the situation in the speaker’s favor, without invoking a negative response from the rival city. Other devices employed are proper use of adverbs and nouns to emphasize their strength. In addition, restatement, figures, and factual information seemed to work in favor of Seoul. Through effective use of rhetorical devices, these speeches spotlighted a vivid contrast to Nagoya, making the most of Seoul’s strength: its almost completed facilities.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Seoul used testimony and

even irony to dramatize its strength. For instance, Mr. Cho said, "this point [the sports facilities being almost completed] was well borne out by the delegates of the IOC, NOC and ISF who visited. . .to look into the sports facilities and related environment of Seoul." To endorse this point, Mr. Cho later said, "we have been too busy constructing facilities and somehow neglected to inform the sporting world about it." This sounded quite ironic, suggesting that Nagoya has been too busy informing the sporting world of their plan, and somehow neglected to construct the facilities.

### 3. Burning Enthusiasm for Invitation (Positive)

The Korean speakers conveyed their burning enthusiasm to welcome the Olympics to Seoul. Both speakers of Seoul directly appealed to the listeners, expressing their sincere appreciation of the listeners' attention, and the excitement of the citizens of Seoul. For instance, Mayor Park stated, "I have been deeply touched by the warm hospitality shown to all of us by the citizens of Baden-Baden, . . . I sincerely solicit your active support for all of our endeavors." Similarly, Mr. Cho appealed, "the people of Seoul join in this expectation for hosting the Games and they enjoy the full support and encouragement of all the people and the government of Korea."

In communicating their enthusiasm, Mr. Cho touched upon the Olympic principle of universality. He stressed, "it is important, . . . to share the hosting role among nations and thus spread the Olympic Movement throughout the world." He then boldly declared:

I sincerely appeal to you the members of the IOC to support the courage and efforts which the City of Seoul has demonstrated, the first such endeavor ever undertaken by a developing country.



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One can easily imagine how painful it is to call his own country a developing country, even though she is rapidly catching up with advanced countries. Such a bold definition of themselves must have been perceived as an expression of their sincerity and confidence. And at the same time, it indirectly suggested that Japan had already staged two Olympic Games in the past, and Nagoya's candidacy is not consistent with the Olympic principle of universality. Thus, comparison and contrast to Nagoya and reinforcement by strong appeal probably gained a high degree of comprehension.

### Analysis III: Acceptance

#### A. Nagoya

##### 1. Three Proofs (Neutral)

Dr. Azuma's proof was mostly emotional. It was full of strong personal tones. Hence, attention was naturally directed to Dr. Azuma himself, rather than helping to accept Nagoya's solicitation.

Mr. Miyake's proofs were rather counterproductive. There were some inconsistencies in his logical proofs. For example, he said, "two-thirds of the residents of Nagoya supported. . .," while later he stated, "an overwhelming majority of the Japanese are enthusiastic about inviting." Realistically, it is difficult to prove such a statement. Concerning his emotional proof, he used it rather improperly. For example, he condemned the opposition groups strongly, claiming that "their real aim is to destroy the Olympic Movement itself." The listeners, however, were not fully persuaded why those groups aimed to do so. He could have used a logical proof by asserting, for instance, that while these groups were concerned about the environmental effect the Olympics would have on

our living condition, the recent study done by the city revealed that such effect would not be too serious.

Some favorable points were observed in Mr. Miyake's speech. He stressed:

Since our coming here to Baden-Baden, we have further renewed our understanding of the tremendous potential and increasing importance the Olympic Movement has in the modern world, . . . we may add another successful chapter to the history of the Olympic Movement in 1988.

The noble and lofty ways of presenting his ethical proof might have helped in gaining the listeners' acceptance, even a little.

## 2. Identification and Internalization (Neutral-Negative)

Despite the carefully formulated strategy, Nagoya's presentation did not link its assertions with the ideas, values and frames of reference of the audience. With lack of such links between the speakers and the audience, chances are few that the listeners would identify themselves with the speakers' arguments and appeals. Actually, little was mentioned about the IOC members and Olympic ideals. Nagoya's assurance for smooth operation was overemphasized. Under such circumstances, it was difficult for the listeners to identify themselves with Nagoya, or to internalize the speakers' values so that they could vote for Nagoya.

What's more, the presentation failed to impress the listeners about Nagoya. They were not persuaded why it was significant to hold the Olympics in Nagoya, not Seoul. The speech of Mr. Miyake only partially succeeded in creating the sentiment of the moment. The language employed, however lofty it was, did not arouse in the minds of the listeners a feeling of sympathy, empathy or willingness to support Nagoya. Prob-

ably, those in favor of Nagoya had a neutral reaction, while those in favor of Seoul had a strongly negative reaction against Nagoya.

### B. Seoul

#### 1. Three Proofs (Positive-Neutral)

Seoul's speeches worked well in logical proof. As was discussed already in previous sections, Seoul's speeches employed various devices in their discourse to draw attention, and increase comprehension. These devices were also helpful in inducing identification and internalization. Above all, the manner in which Seoul's "Achilles' heel," political tension in the Korean peninsula, was refuted, was a good example. Important to note in this regard is that the audience's ego-needs were fully satisfied. *The Japan Times* reported:

They [the IOC members] have no reason to be displeased by the prospect of being instrumental in promoting the spirit of reconciliation and peace between the two Koreas.<sup>60</sup>

The Korean speakers skillfully introduced various devices to change, modify and reshape the listener's ideas and values, thus making it possible to induce attitude change of the audience.

Campaign activities until the last moment of voting, even after the presentation, were crucial. Lobbying activities, greeting and final solicitation in front of the conference hall were important in reinforcing or strengthening the voters' choice in candidate's favor. In this respect, too, the Korean delegation wound up their final efforts in inducing identification and internalization.<sup>61</sup>

### Conclusion

As soon as Nagoya's loss was made public, the Japanese press devoted quite a large space identifying the possible major causes. Ranging from IOC's principle of sharing the role among nations to lack of enthusiasm on the part of the citizens of Nagoya; more than a dozen reasons were cited.<sup>62</sup> While these criticisms and comments were freely made since Nagoya's loss is already history, there was very little discussion of the possible impact the presentations of both cities might have had on the final outcome. As a matter of fact, while the presentations by both cities were completed, only Nagoya's was favorably reported in the Japanese press, and very little was reported on Seoul's. So Japanese readers could not make a fair and comparative judgment of which one was more effective.

The Japanese readers had been handicapped by biased reporting by the news media. The reporters from each major Japanese newspaper had been dispatched to Baden-Baden, but they had difficulties covering what was going on in the competition between Nagoya and Seoul. Even though many Korean delegates were visible and active everywhere, the Japanese reporters did not have access to them, partly because of language problems.<sup>63</sup> As a result, they had a tendency to stick together and rely on the same sources of information for their reporting.<sup>64</sup> There is no wonder, therefore, that the contents of the reports among the major Japanese newspapers were almost identical with each other.

Rhetorically speaking, Seoul's presentation was more effective in many aspects. The speeches are the product of serious study. Their rhetorical strategies were formulated to refute their weakness while providing a new insight, and to stress their advantages without invoking a sense of resentment from the opponent. Also what was noteworthy was the

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clarification of their basic attitudes to the invitation of the Olympics, organization of discourse, paragraph development, use of logical, emotional, and ethical proof, as well as proper choice of words.

As for Nagoya's presentation, one can point out that there was a lack of coherent rhetorical strategy. Even though some devices incorporated into the speeches were partly effective, the problem was rather with the overall impression of the invitational speeches. Particularly, the manner in which certain themes of mutual concern were presented to the audience which turned out to be counterproductive. For instance, Nagoya's strength — political stability of Japan and experience gained by the Tokyo and Sapporo Olympics — had probably invoked strong negative reactions, just by the way these particular points were presented to the audience.

One can speculate at least two reasons why Nagoya's presentation lacked coherent rhetorical strategy. First, Nagoya's delegation was not adequately aware of the importance of presentation in terms of its influence on the outcome. Probably they regarded it as one of the rituals or ceremonies that accompany invitational campaigns. Hence, the speech was not considered to be a subject worthy of serious study. This was clearly not the case with Seoul. Second, Nagoya's delegation identified themselves with Japan, and they probably took a rather traditional view of Korea with certain stereotypes (Woon, 1983:3). For this reason, Nagoya might have underestimated the power and ability of her rival city in terms of her skill in international persuasion.

Persuasion in an international arena involves many factors that do not require careful consideration when the speech is intended for homogeneous or mono-cultural audiences. People from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds have different values and assumptions about their lives, their human relations, and their approaches to the problems they face. For instance, one dominant feature of American social

interaction is based on "equality," whereas the Japanese place importance on "vertical relationship." Likewise, people from different cultures are likely to be persuaded for different reasons.

However, a number of international organizations are developing in the present world. The U.N., I.L.O., International Rotary Club, just to name a few. Those international organizations have gradually developed their own values and ideals through interaction among members from different cultures. The IOC is a good case in point. IOC members are united through their devotion to the Olympic Movement, and they share a lot of common experiences through their activities to promote Olympic ideals. Consequently, they come to share common sets of values, as well as sets of expectations of their own. The speaker, therefore, is required to study their values and expectations, before he engages himself in a campaign of persuasion.

In this connection, formulation of rhetorical strategies for presentation is quite necessary. In the case of Nagoya and Seoul rivalry, both parties used mainly English as a means of communication. Since English has its own logic, consideration on such matters as organization of the speech, methods for argumentation, proper choice of words must be incorporated into overall strategies.

To be more specific, many other questions can be asked in devising your rhetorical strategies. How should your weakness be refuted? How do you present your strength without directly criticizing your opponent? What about the traditional proofs? Do you need a lot of inside stories or anecdotes to make the speech interesting and alive? Is dramatization necessary? How serious should you be in communicating your view? How do you meet the expectation of the listeners? How are the self-interests of the listeners satisfied? How much detail should there be in your report? What kinds of evidence are you going to use? Will direct appeal work? These ques-

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tions must be seriously asked before planning your rhetorical strategies.

In view of the complexities involved in formulation of strategies, we should realize that drafting of an invitational speech in international setting is a much more difficult task than is generally imagined. We should also bear in mind that the speech draft be left for last-minute revision, for the speech should be adjusted to the changing mood of the audience. And at the same time, a decision must be made who can most effectively communicate your views. The speaker's credibility may be very influential under certain circumstances.

Equally important is a need for the study of your rival, particularly his national character and communication characteristics. It just happened that the competition for the '88 Summer Olympics was between Nagoya and Seoul, close neighbors in North East Asia. A study shows that Koreans are more verbal, emotional as well as aggressive than Japanese in interpersonal and public communication situations.<sup>65</sup> In addition, because of unfortunate historical relations with Japan, the Koreans' attitude toward Japanese is far from that of respect and affection (Woon, 1983:7). It reports also that Koreans have a value system of expediency.<sup>66</sup> Several assumptions could have been drawn from these findings that the delegates from Seoul would make surprisingly energetic efforts even at the last stage of the game. Furthermore, because of some unfortunate historical relations with Japan, the Koreans' enthusiasm and tenacity to beat Japan could not have been underestimated. Without making careful studies of your rival, presentations in international settings cannot be effectively made.

One can draw several implications from the foregoing discussion for those involved in English education in Japan. First, we should realize that we are still poor in communicating in English what we really want to say to the international community. It may be true that enthusiasm among Japanese

of learning English is even higher nowadays than before, and teachers are devoting themselves more to upgrading the speaking ability of the Japanese. However, the image of the Japanese abroad as poor English speakers is still prevalent. One major reason for this is, I believe, the mentality of the Japanese toward English. There seems to be a deep-rooted fear among Japanese that if you become too good at speaking English, you would be ostracized from the group you belong to. For instance, a very fluent speaker of English in Japan is likely to be regarded as less of a leader in political or industrial world, even though he may be considered an important liaison person with the world outside Japan. In other words, if you become an expert of English, you are no longer regarded as pure Japanese, so that you cannot occupy the highest position in Japanese organization. Perhaps for this reason, many Japanese students of English are learning English as necessary knowledge for understanding the world but not as a necessary skill to communicate with others. This passive attitude of the Japanese toward English should be changed, for I believe that it is possible for a Japanese to be a perfect Japanese and at the same time to be a capable international communicator.

Second, the Japanese attitude toward language should also be changed when they study English. Kunihiro argues that language has not received the same emphasis as in the West and it has been a poor policy to use words to express one's views and to persuade the other fellow (1973:97). In a similar way, public speaking or presentation is often regarded just as a ritualistic or ceremonial one. In such occasions as wedding reception, graduation ceremony, and political campaign speech, distinguished guests are invited and are expected to deliver their speeches. However, the speeches are rather ceremonial or ritualistic, reflecting the tradition in Japan. T.V. debates among political contenders are yet to be seen in Japan. On the contrary, the invitational speeches at Baden-



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Baden clearly demonstrated that they were used not for ceremonies but for persuasion. I believe we should be more aware of the effect of spoken communication in international persuasion.

In this particular connection, I would suggest that English education in Japan should incorporate such fields as speech, group discussion and debate, most of which had been considered as a part of the extracurricular activities in Japanese universities. If students are given ample opportunities to express their views in English, they can learn how to speak to effectively influence others. At the same time, they can acquire the logic and reasoning patterns of English if properly guided. It is equally important for them to be given more time to evaluate or criticize the presentations of others so that they can develop their critical and analytical faculty. By so doing, they can come to grips with rhetoric which plays a vital role in persuasion as was discussed in this paper.

The failure of Nagoya provided a number of lessons for the Japanese. We often talk about Japan's "internationalization," but it is important for us to become aware that we still have a long way to go until we will be able to communicate effectively with the people from different cultures.

### NOTES

1. *Asahi Shimbun* or *Asahi Newspaper* (Oct. 1, 1981).
2. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Evening Edition), Oct. 1, 1981).
3. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Aug. 25, 1977).
4. *Ibid.*
5. Osamu Miura and Ruichi Kanko, ed. *Events – News Stories in English, Japan: 19751-1981* (Tokyo: Tsurumi Shoten, 1981), pp. 30-32.

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6. *Nagoya Olympics* No. 4 (Dec. 15, 1979), p. 31. This periodical was issued six times for public relations' purpose by the Council for Olympics during the period from 1978 until 1980.
7. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Evening Edition, Sept. 25, 1979).
8. The Nagoya '88 Olympic Council, ed. *Report on Invitational Activities by Nagoya City and Tokai Area for the 24th Summer Olympic Games* (Aug. 30, 1981), p. 22.
9. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Aug. 30, 1981).
10. *Ibid* (Aug. 30, 1981).
11. *Ibid* (May 18, 1978).
12. *Ibid* (Evening Edition, May 2, 1979).
13. *Ibid* (May 18, 1979).
14. *Ibid* (Evening Edition, Oct. 26, 1979).
15. *Asahi Shimbun* (Evening Edition, Oct. 26, 1979).
16. *Ibid* (Evening Edition, Jan. 21, 1980).
17. *Chunichi Shimbun* (May 25, 1980).
18. *Ibid* (Evening Edition, Oct. 17, 1980).
19. *Ibid*.
20. *Ibid* (Dec. 2, 1980).
21. *Asahi Shimbun* (Dec. 5, 1980).
22. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Dec. 17, 1980).
23. *Ibid* (Feb. 25, 1981).
24. *Mainichi Shimbun* (March 3, 1981).

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25. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* or *Japan Economic Newspaper* (April 4, 1981).
26. *Mainichi Shimbun* (July 22, 1981).
27. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Evening Edition, April 10, 1981).
28. *Asahi Shimbun* (Sept. 7, 1981).
29. *Ibid* (Sept. 9, 1981).
30. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Sept. 22, 1981).
31. *Chubu Yomiuri Shimbun* Sept. 27, 1981).
32. *Ibid*.
33. Personal Interview with Yohji Kawamura, Special Correspondent to Baden-Baden for Chunichi Newspaper Company, conducted on May 15, 1982.
34. *Asahi Shimbun* (Evening Edition, Sept. 24, 1981).
35. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Sept. 25, 1981).
36. *Ibid* (Sept. 27, 1981).
37. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Evening Edition, Oct. 1, 1981).
38. *Ibid* (Sept. 27, 1981).
39. *Ibid* (Sept. 25, 1981).
40. *Ibid* (Sept. 26, 1981).
41. Personal Interview with Yohji Kawamura.
42. Personal Interview with Yukihiro Ueda, Special Correspondent to Baden-Baden for Chubu Yomiuru Newspaper Company, conducted on May 26, 1982.

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43. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Oct. 1, 1981).
44. Personal Interview with Yukihiko Ueda.
45. *Chubu Yomiuri Shimbun* (Sept. 25, 1981).
46. *Asahi Shimbun* (Oct. 1, 1981).
47. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Sept. 26, 1981).
48. Ibid (Sept. 1981).
49. Personal Interview with Yohji Kawamura.
50. *Chunichi Shimbun* (Sept. 29, 1981).
51. Ibid (Sept. 30, 1981).
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid (Sept. 20, 1981).
54. The text of the Japanese presentation used for this paper was drawn from the *Report on Invitational Activities by Nagoya City and Tokai Area for the 24th Summer Olympics* (pp. 49-55) published by the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council in December 1981. Consequently, all of the quotations of Dr. Azuma and Mr. Miyake's words, phrases, and passages were drawn from this version.
55. Personal Interview with Tsutomu Aoyama, one of Nagoya's six official delegates who participated in the presentation, conducted on May 26, 1982.
56. For example, Mr. Miyake made an invitational speech in Lausanne for ISF members on April 8, 1981. See *Chunichi Shimbun* (April 9, 1981).
57. Personal Interview with Tsutomu Aoyama.

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58. The text of the Korean presentation used for this paper was drawn from a copy of the presentations distributed to reporters during the presentation. Accordingly, all of the quotations of Mr. Park and Mr. Cho's words, phrases, and passages were drawn from this version.
59. *Asahi Shimbun* (Oct. 1, 1981).
60. *The Japan Times* (Oct. 2, 1981).
61. *Asahi Shimbun* (Oct. 1, 1981).
62. Ibid.
63. Personal Interview with Yohji Kawamura.
64. Ibid.
65. R. Dereck Liebenberg, "Japan Incorporated" and "The Korean Troops": A Comparative Analysis of Korean Business Organization, M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1982.
66. Ibid.

### APPENDIX

The text of invitational speeches by the representatives of Nagoya and Seoul is attached as follows for reference.

#### TEXT OF PRESENTATIONS

##### NAGOYA

##### 1) Taped Message by Ryutaro Azuma, President of the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council

Mr. President and Members of the International Olympic Committee. Although I retired from the active membership and became an Honorary Member in 1968, my Olympic spirit and my interest in the Olympic movement has remained as ever.

When the City of Nagoya decided to invite the Games of 1988, my Olympic friends in Japan persuaded me, an octogenarian, to come out of retirement and accept the Presidency of the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council.

Remembering the excitement I, then Governor of Tokyo, experienced at the Munich Session of I.O.C., 22 years ago, when the honour to stage the Games of the 18th Olympiad was bestowed upon us, I have made up my mind to lead the Nagoya Delegation to Baden Baden for the official presentation of candidature.

To my deep regret, however, my doctor's advice has prevented me from making a travel abroad. Yes, my spirit is high but alas, my old bones are creaking, so to speak. And, therefore, I have asked Mr. Shigemitsu Miyake, one of the eminent leaders of Nagoya community and whom many of you have become acquainted with, to take my place. I sincerely hope, my dear Colleagues, that you would support him in order to give us the chance to see another Olympic Games in my country during my lifetime.

May I thank you, Mr. President and Members of I.O.C. for giving me the opportunity to address you through this tape?

2) Presentation by Shigemitsu Miyake, Chairman of the Executive Board of the Nagoya '88 Olympic Council

Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the International Olympic Committee, leaders and representatives of International Federations and National Olympic Committees, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is indeed a great honour and privilege for me to explain our plans for hosting the Games of the 24th Olympiad in Nagoya in 1988.

The words of Dr. Azuma, which you have just heard, have already expressed the aspirations, hopes and expectations of the citizens of Nagoya, and the Japanese nation as a whole. Therefore, my presentation will concentrate on concrete issues: how we are planning to organize the Olympic Games in Nagoya, and how we can assure you that – in the event we obtain your support and approval – the Games will be held in accordance with the traditions, spirit, and regulations of the Olympic Movement, while at the same time, meeting the requirements and wishes of the International Federations and National Olympic Committees which will be participating from throughout the world.

Nagoya, which we are proposing as the Olympic City for 1988, is rich in natural blessings, with long and rich cultural and historical traditions, flourishing industries, and a well-developed communications net-

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work. This region is one of the three largest industrial and cultural centers in Japan. The climate is mild, there are many scenic beauty spots and historic sites nearby, and the people are dedicated and industrious.

Thus, speaking from geographical, economic, cultural, and other perspectives, our region is fully capable of successfully organizing and managing the Olympic Games. And, in addition to these guarantees, I would like to stress that we will utilize the latest and highest technology being developed in Japan to ensure the Games' success.

The spirit and character of the people, the experience already gained by Japan in organizing the Olympic Games in Tokyo and Sapporo, our earnest wish to embody the true international understanding and world peace through the Games — these are, Ladies and Gentlemen, the foremost and solid guarantees we offer for the successful staging of the Games in 1988.

Now, allow me to explain a few major points of our plan for the 1988 Games that may interest you.

The first regards timing.

We propose holding the Games from October the 8th to the 23rd. The climate at this time is comfortably mild, with the daytime temperature around 20 degrees Centigrade, or 68 degrees Fahrenheit.

As you have seen in the film, at the time of the Games, you will be surrounded by beautiful scenery coloured with autumn leaves. There will be numerous traditional festivals as well.

The second point concerns the number of sporting events.

The sports program will be organized in accordance with the I.O.C. rules. All 21 sports of the Olympic Charter will be staged. The program of events will be adapted in accordance with any further changes proposed by the I.O.C. in the future.

Now, the third point:

Concerning the Olympic Village, it is our intention to build only one, accommodating 12,000 people, in the city area, which will be located within easy reach of the sites of all sports events. The planned site is quiet and pleasant, surrounded by trees. The village buildings, which are to be newly constructed for the Games, will be converted into a public housing complex after the Games are over. The village will also be provided with adequate practice grounds, medical facilities and other services. Detached accommodations for improved access to particular sports can also be provided if necessary.

One further point I would like to mention is that all Olympic facilities will be located within a radius of 30-40 kilos from the village. Even the yachting events will be within 90 kilos, which is very close

when compared with recent Olympic Games.

The fourth point I would like to discuss concerns sports and training facilities.

In our plans we have estimated that some 31 sites will be required for competition. Of these, 21 already exist. The rest will be newly built. Here I wish to stress that, given the seven years of preparation time, Nagoya can assure you that the most modern facilities will be readied, utilizing the best of Japan's technology.

In addition, a total of 78 training facilities will be provided for various sports.

We have explained details regarding each sports facility and consulted with the leaders of the respective summer federations on the occasion of the meeting of the International Federations held in Lausanne in April this year. We were fortunate in receiving their kind advice, guidance and understanding.

The fifth point:

Turning to accommodations and other facilities, we can assure you that comfortable accommodations will be prepared for delegates, officials, visitors, and also the press, radio and TV personnel. Especially we are considering to provide quite pleasant and comfortable ones for the I.O.C. and IF members.

Also, many conference halls with modern facilities are available for the I.O.C. Session, the I.F. Congresses, the N.O.C. Assemblies, and other meetings.

Radio and TV centers and other working press facilities will also be readied. I can assure you of the highest possible standards for ensuring full world-wide coverage of the 1988 Games.

In terms of medical care, as we have numerous modern facilities with excellent doctors and staff, we are ready to observe all the instructions of the medical commission of the I.O.C.

The sixth point:

The transportation network in and around Nagoya includes taxis, buses, subways, and private and national railway systems, and visitors to Nagoya can take advantage of inexpensive, thoroughly safe and convenient transportation throughout the region.

We will furnish large and small buses and cars for officials and teams, to give them mobility for their special training and competition.

Special devices for traffic control similar to those used during the Tokyo Games can also be installed if necessary.

The seventh point:

Entry is fully guaranteed. Let me quote the letter of confirmation



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signed by Mr. Zenko Suzuki, Prime Minister of Japan. Quote:

“The Japanese Government states that it will comply with the provisions of the Olympic Charter and will grant the right of entry into Japan to all persons duly accredited by the International Olympic Committee.”

unquote. Japan is a very politically stable country, and enjoys diplomatic and friendly relations with almost all countries in the world.

As for security, I would like to emphasize that Japan is one of the safest nations in the world. And, as a matter of course, security for the proper conduct of the Games will be ensured by the appropriate public authorities.

The eighth point:

Regarding public support. We conducted our first public opinion surveys concerning the Games just two years ago, and found that two-thirds of the residents of Nagoya region supported hosting the 24th Olympiad.

Based on these survey results, the assemblies of Nagoya City and the three prefectures making up this region unanimously passed resolutions to invite the Games to Nagoya.

Last November, the Japanese Cabinet formally approved our candidacy, and this May both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet unanimously passed similar resolutions.

Some 170 other official and private organizations in many fields have also passed resolutions or otherwise expressed their support.

Thus, I believe you can see that an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people are enthusiastic about inviting the Games to Nagoya, and are supporting our candidacy.

However, I do not deny that there are also some small opposition groups in Japan. During the last few days, some of them have come here to Baden Baden to conduct a campaign, not only against the Nagoya games, but also against the whole Olympic Movement. Their real aim is to destroy the Olympic Movement itself.

Such groups are very small in Japanese society, and, their self-complacent logic is nothing but deceptions and full of malice.

I hope you all will kindly understand these real facts, and please not be misled by them.

As Japan's political situation is quite stable, if we are awarded to stage the Games, we will surely be able to carry them out quite successfully, even if there might be such groups.

Now, the ninth point:

Regarding the financing of the Games. The actual figures on construction and administration expenses for the Games have yet to be finalized. However, the rough estimates we have made so far show they will not greatly burden either the central or local governments. With this in mind, the three prefectures of Aichi, Gifu and Mie, and the Government of Japan, have approved the candidacy of Nagoya and declared their full support.

Moreover, there are various devices for reducing the burden on budgets to some extent.

Finally, another important point:

We are giving serious consideration to ways and means to reduce the air fares for teams coming from faraway nations in Africa, South America and other areas.

Also, we are considering methods of keeping accommodation costs within reasonable limits during the Games for the athletes, officials and the press.

These efforts are directed toward ensuring worldwide participation and thus maintaining the universality of the Olympic Movement.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe I touched on some of the major points of our candidacy.

And, in conclusion, in proposing for 1988, we feel an even greater sense of responsibility. This is because, since our coming here to Baden Baden, we have further renewed our understanding of the tremendous potential and increasing importance the Olympic Movement has in the modern world. Japan is a faithful supporter of this movement, as you are fully aware.

And now, we are determined to fulfill our responsibility – faithfully – and completely, so that that we may add another successful chapter to the history of the Olympic Movement in 1988.

Thank you for your attention.

## SEOUL

### 1) Proposal to Host the Games of the 24th Olympiad in Seoul in 1988 by Young-su Park, Mayor, City of Seoul

Honorable Mr. President Juan Antonio Samaranch, Distinguished members of the International Olympic Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I sincerely thank you for the honor and privilege of addressing this important session of the International Olympic Committee to express

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the earnest desire of the eight million citizens of Seoul to host the 1988 Olympic Games.

I am grateful to the members of the IOC and various national delegates for their encouragement and support of our candidature. We extend our thanks also to President Willi Daume and members of the National Olympic Committee of Germany for capably organizing this session of the IOC. I have been deeply touched by the warm hospitality shown to all of us by the citizens of Baden-Baden.

At this very moment, the 38 million people of the Republic of Korea, and especially the citizens of Seoul, are focusing their attention and expectations on this IOC session, which will decide the host city for the Games of the 24th Olympiad in 1988. They hope and desire from the bottom of their hearts that each and every member of the IOC will support Seoul's candidature.

Many years ago, the City of Seoul initiated long range plans to develop facilities suitable for holding the Olympic Games. Construction has been underway already for a number of years, and I believe our response to the IOC Questionnaire reflects the energetic and dedicated efforts we have been making in preparation for the Olympic Games.

Distinguished members of the International Olympic Committee!

I am not proposing Seoul as the site for the 1988 Olympics, simply because facilities both already built and now under construction would best meet the requirements of the Olympic Games. This is, of course, a very important consideration. But even more important, we believe that Olympic Games in Seoul would accomplish the goal of the Olympic Movement of contributing to world peace, since the spirit of international goodwill through fair sportsmanship would help insure a true and lasting peace on the Korea soil.

I'm certain that a decision by the IOC to hold the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul would be a most important act in furthering its goal of world peace. Olympic Games in Seoul would truly be a forum for peace and broadened mutual understanding among all mankind.

I sincerely solicit your active support for all of our endeavors. I should be delighted to be able to invite all of you to the Seoul Olympics of 1988 in the hope that you would enjoy the traditional warmth and hospitality that is characteristic of the Korean people.

President Sang-Ho Cho of the Korean Olympic Committee will continue to brief you in detail on Seoul's plans for hosting the Olympics in 1988.

Thank you very much.

**2) Presentation by Sang-Ho Cho, President Korean Olympic Committee**

Mr. President, Honorable members of the International Olympic Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen.

As President of the Korean Olympic Committee, I am pleased to inform you that in connection with the application submitted by the City of Seoul for hosting the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, our committee has rendered all possible cooperation and assistance as required by the spirit of the International Olympic Committee Charter and other relevant regulations.

As the Mayor, on behalf of the citizens of Seoul, has just made clear, he is determined to host the 1988 Olympic Games. The people of Seoul join in this expectation for hosting the Games and they enjoy the full support and encouragement of all the people and the government of Korea.

At this moment, 8.5 million Seoul citizens are watching this IOC session with great eagerness. They are hopeful for the support of each of the IOC members.

With a long-standing view toward hosting the Olympic Games, Seoul City, already in the 1970s, made detailed investigation into its possibilities for hosting the games and began to take concrete steps in this regard.

For example, the City in 1977 secured a sports site of 545,000m<sup>2</sup> which will include as its centerpiece the main stadium with the capacity of 100,000.

With 60% of the construction already completed, it is expected that the stadium will be ready for use by 1983.

In 1979, the city secured 2,640,000m<sup>2</sup> of land in the suburbs for building a National Sports Complex which would be appropriate for 1988 Summer Olympic Games.

I believe that the distinguished members of the IOC have a good understanding of the plan and efforts of Seoul City for hosting the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, by virtue of its replies to questionnaires submitted to the IOC. Since the time for my presentation is limited, I'll summarize only salient points.

First, Seoul is the capital of the Republic of Korea. It has transportation, communication, accommodation, cultural and other facilities comparable to those of other cities which have successfully hosted the Olympic Games in the past.

Second, the City of Seoul has successfully organized and hosted the

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42nd World Shooting Championships in 1978, the 8th World Women's Basketball Championships in 1979, the 2nd Asian Athletic Championships in 1975, and other important international events. Seoul's plan to host the Olympic Games is based upon these valuable experiences in managing international games and events.

Third, except for a few special facilities required for the Olympics, Seoul already has most of the necessary sports facilities, including the main and auxiliary stadiums, either fully completed and in use or in advanced stage of construction.

Most of the required facilities including Olympic Village are concentrated in close proximity of the sports complex, and are linked by subways and road-ways presently in existence so that we do not face transportation difficulties.

Fourth, Korea has two broadcasting stations with nationwide networks and one earth station with an international transmitting system using two Pacific and Indian circuit lines.

In addition, Korea plans to erect two more earth stations, and one reserve station, which will be adequate to cover the 1988 Olympic Games.

Fifth, Seoul receives more than one million foreign tourists each year who enjoy free and safe travelling. A large number of international sports events have been hosted in Seoul to the satisfaction of all participants. At these meetings, all affiliated federations have been invited without exception. In short, there is no cause for concern about the free and safe entry and exit of Olympic officials, athletes, and spectators participating in the Olympic Games.

In order to ensure this principle in regard with the Olympic Games, the Republic of Korea has submitted to the IOC an official letter guaranteeing the free entry and exit for all. I know that many IOC members present here have visited Korea, and I think that they are in a position to bear out my statement.

Sixth, the medical facilities and medical staff in Seoul City are entirely efficient to meet all IOC requirements, including the administration of doping tests. In this matter, we pledge full cooperation with the IOC medical commission.

Seventh, Korea has a large number of well trained and skilled people who have received advanced education. Especially, there are colleges and universities which provide instruction in foreign languages and training for language specialists. This will resolve any possible language barriers for officials and athletes who will come to Seoul for the Olympics.

Eighth, Seoul City can provide adequate Olympic cultural programs

based upon its unique cultural heritage and characteristics. Seoul will set up an Olympic Youth Camp in a scenic spot near Seoul so that the young people of the world may have glimpses of Korea, the "Land of the Morning Calm."

Ninth, Korea has maintained a high annual economic growth rate of 10% in the 1970s and is expected to sustain its economic growth in the 1980s.

Given this prospect of economic development, Seoul will be able to provide even better facilities and environment to meet the needs of the 1988 Olympic Games.

Tenth, I wish to emphasize as an important point that Seoul and the Republic of Korea, have never hosted the Olympic Games. Considering the Olympic principle of universality, of free and full participation of all peoples and nations, it is important, and indeed stated many times at this congress, to share the hosting role among nations and thus spread the Olympic Movement throughout the world. Accordingly, award of the Games to Seoul is acting along the principle laid down with the Olympic Charter.

I sincerely appeal to the members of the IOC to support the courage and efforts which the City of Seoul has demonstrated by its initiative to host the 1988 Olympic Games, the first such endeavor ever undertaken by a developing country in the history of the Olympics.

Mr. President, The Republic of Korea faithfully upholds the spirit of sportsmanship stipulated in the Charter of the IOC!

I would like to specially address some members here who might be concerned about the reality of the division of my country. I wish to express my deep appreciation on this occasion to the delegates of those countries with whom we have as yet no formal relations, for their invitations to our officials and players to participate in the sports events held in their countries, and for their participation in sports events in our country.

I am convinced that one of the most important roles the IOC plays in the quest for world peace is to provide a forum for dialogue and communication through sports events for countries having differing political ideologies.

I believe that Seoul has sufficient capabilities to hold the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in view of its conditions and of the international status enjoyed by the Republic of Korea.

This point was well borne out by the delegates of the IOC, NOC and ISF who visited Korea early this year to look into the sports facilities and related environment of Seoul.

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Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the IOC, we have perhaps been too busy constructing facilities and somehow neglected to inform the sporting world about it.

The City of Seoul firmly pledges to you that it will promote friendship among other participating countries through the 1988 Olympic Games, and that it will contribute to the advancement of world peace by the effective and harmonized management of the Olympic events. It appeals to you to take the principle of spreading the Olympic Movement throughout the world into your consideration. It guarantees mentally and logistically that it will be ready to host the Games.

Our motto is Friendship, Harmony, and Peace.

I sincerely hope to have the opportunity of welcoming all the IOC members gathered here at the grand opening ceremony for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in the main stadium in Seoul. It will be a great honor and pleasure for me personally as well as in my official capacity.

Finally, I am pleased to announce that I have with me a film which shows the existing and planned facilities in Seoul and the overall developing situation of the city. This will assist to bring closer to reality what I have stated in my presentation.

I hope those members who have never visited Seoul will gain some insights into the City of Seoul, and after the film the Korean delegation would be very glad to respond to any questions you might raise.

Thank you.

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